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Articles
Wading into the Daubert Tide:
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of
Southern California
David L. Faigman* and Edward J. Imwinkelried**
In Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, the California Supreme
Court decided arguably the most important expert testimony decision that it has rendered
in at least two decades. Prior to Sargon, California appeared steadfastly committed to the
classic “general acceptance” test, which required judges to assess whether an expert’s
theory or technique had gained general acceptance in the relevant fields. In 1993, in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the United States Supreme Court
announced a new empirical validation test. In the years since 1993, most state courts
adopted some version of Daubert, but until Sargon the California Supreme Court had
refused to follow the federal lead.
Sargon undoubtedly moves California jurisprudence toward the Daubert approach. In
Sargon, the court adopted the fundamental perspective of Daubert and embraced key
terminology from the Daubert opinion and its progeny. These parallels have prompted
some commentators to declare that California is now in the Daubert camp.
Although Sargon is a step toward the Daubert approach, it is premature to conclude that
Sargon goes that far for at least two reasons. First, even post-Sargon, the California
approach may be laxer than the federal approach. In Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated
that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) governs the trial judge’s admissibility decision,
which mandates that the judge probe deeply into the bases for the expert’s opinion, even
including assessing credibility. Sargon stops short of explicitly going that far. Second, the
California approach may prove to be more demanding than the federal approach. In a
footnote, Sargon indicates that the Frye test is still good law in California. If so, then some
proponents may face the daunting task of surmounting both hurdles to admissibility.

* John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law; Professor of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine; Director,
University of California, San Francisco/University of California, Hastings Consortium on Law, Science,
and Health Policy.
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Introduction
Since the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case
1
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1993, state courts and
legislatures have confronted the persistent question of whether they
should adopt the evidentiary test established by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Like a slowly rising tide, the Daubert test has washed over most
state expert evidence rules. Today, the majority of states employ Daubert
2
3
entirely and explicitly, while many others do so implicitly or partially.
Still, several states have held out, steadfastly maintaining their
independence from the federal regime—though most of these states model
their rules on another federal case, Daubert’s predecessor Frye v. United
4
States. California has been perhaps the highest profile holdout, due to a

1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Ala. R. Evid. § 702 (2012) (adopting a rule “identical to the corresponding Federal
Rule of Evidence”); see also David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and
Science of Expert Testimony 20 n.8 (2012) (collecting cases).
3. See, e.g., Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1004 (Alaska 2005) (“But we have never
adopted Kumho Tire’s extension of Daubert to all expert testimony . . . . [W]e limit our application of
Daubert to expert testimony based on scientific theory, as opposed to testimony based upon the
expert’s personal experience.”); see also David Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos
Litigation, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 11, 22 (2003); 1 Paul C. Giannelli et al, Scientific Evidence §§ 1.14–15
(5th ed. 2012) (collecting cases); Faigman et al., supra note 2, at 20 n.8.
4. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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substantial jurisprudence built around its 1976 People v. Kelly decision,
which adopted Frye’s general acceptance test as the governing standard
5
in California. However, in Sargon Enterprises v. University of Southern
6
California, the California Supreme Court dipped its feet into the Daubert
tide. Although Sargon does not fully incorporate Daubert into California’s
Evidence Code, Sargon signals the court’s interest in testing those waters.
California’s history with expert evidence is checkered to say the least.
Many view California as having adopted a liberal standard for determining
7
the admissibility of such testimony. This perceived liberality could explain
8
the extensive use of expert testimony at trial in California. Yet, the
California Supreme Court adopted the Frye test limiting scientific
testimony to evidence based on theories and techniques generally accepted
in the relevant scientific communities; in doing so, the court asserted that it
was deliberately choosing a conservative admissibility test to compensate
for lay jurors’ supposed tendency to attach undue weight to scientific
testimony. In the ensuing years, however, the court sharply limited the
Kelly test’s scope. In 1984, for example, the court refused to apply the test
to psychological testimony about the supposed unreliability of eyewitness
9
identifications. In doing so, the court commented that the Kelly test
10
should be restricted to “evidence . . . produced by a machine.” The court
reasoned that the Frye test (also called the Kelly-Frye test) is based on
the fear that scientific testimony will overawe the trier of fact, but only
testimony based on instrumental techniques creates this danger to an
11
acute degree. California courts thus apply a conservative Frye-style test
to technologies such as polygraphs, DNA profiling, and blood alcohol
tests, but not to expertise based on the experience of the expert. In fact,
California courts “have never applied the Kelly-Frye rule to expert medical
12
testimony.” In 1989, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its view
that non-instrumental expert testimony is exempt from California’s version
13
of the general acceptance test. The end result has been that in California
civil cases, litigants have been able to present expert medical causation
14
opinions with “relative ease.”
5. 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
6. 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012).
7. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, High Court Changes Evidentiary Standards, Recorder, Dec. 6, 2012,
at 11.
8. California litigators make extensive use of expert testimony at trial. In one study funded by the
Rand Corporation, researchers reviewed 529 California trials. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991
Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1119 (1991). The researchers found that experts appeared at eighty-six percent of the
trials. Id. On average, there were 3.3 experts per trial; at trials with experts, the average was 3.8. Id.
9. People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1984).
10. Id. at 723–24.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 724.
13. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
14. Barnes, supra note 7, at 1.
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Therefore, from 1976 (when Kelly was decided) to Sargon in 2012,
California courts have followed a somewhat divided path. On one side,
when expert testimony involves a scientific test or mechanism, California
courts have applied a rigorously conservative general acceptance standard,
ostensibly to protect jurors from being overawed by a misleading aura of
scientific certainty. In contrast, when the expert testimony was not based
on the results of scientific tests or rested principally on the experience or
inferential judgment of the expert, California courts have used a relaxed
standard and have largely allowed experts to testify if they were qualified
and their opinions were relevant to the facts in dispute.
Meanwhile, the evidentiary jurisprudence surrounding expert
testimony took an altogether different road in the federal courts. In its
1993 Daubert decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in an
opinion by Justice Blackmun, that Frye was no longer good law in federal
practice, despite the fact that it had previously been followed by most
15
federal courts. The Court derived a new admissibility test from the
16
reference to “scientific . . . knowledge” in the text of Federal Rule 702.
Justice Blackmun first asserted that the statutory reference to “knowledge”
17
“connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” He
then adopted an essentially methodological definition of “science”:
The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods
and procedures of science. . . . [I]n order to qualify as “scientific
knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by the
scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation . . . . In short, the requirement that an
expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific
knowledge” establishes
18
a standard of evidentiary reliability.
In relatively short order, the Court rendered two more decisions
under this line of authority. In 1997, the Court decided General Electric
19
Co. v. Joiner. The principal issue presented by Joiner was the proper
standard of appellate review of trial court admissibility decisions. The
Court followed standard evidentiary practice in adopting the abuse of
20
discretion standard for such decisions. Importantly, the Joiner Court
also discussed the methodological standard it had set forth in Daubert,

15. The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975. Justice Blackmun stated that he could
not find any statutory language codifying the traditional general acceptance test. Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–89 (1993). Consequently, the enactment of the Federal Rules
had impliedly superseded the Frye test. See, e.g., David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at
the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the
Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1799, 1808 (1994) (describing the evolving use of
Frye in federal courts prior to Daubert).
16. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90.
17. Id. at 590.
18. Id.
19. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
20. Id.
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21

emphasizing the need for scientific rigor. In response to claims that
Daubert applied only to the methods and principles, and not conclusions,
of a proffered expert’s testimony, the Court asserted:
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to the existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great
an
22
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.
Two years after Joiner, the Court decided the third case of what is
23
now known as the Daubert trilogy, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. The
Kumho Tire Court ruled that the requirement for a showing of reliability
applies to all types of expert testimony, not only to claimed scientific
24
expertise. The Court acknowledged that Rule 702 refers in the alternative
to “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” but pointed out
that all three adjectives modify “knowledge,” a “word . . . that ‘establishes
25
a standard of evidentiary reliability.’” The Court was insistent that “an
expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, [must] employ[] in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
26
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” By
the end of that decade, in 2000, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
Daubert and its progeny had established that to be admissible, any expert
27
testimony must satisfy “exacting standards of reliability.”
As the contrast between the relatively permissive California
standards and the rather demanding federal standards became more
pronounced, the question arose as to whether California would continue
to adhere to Frye for scientific evidence or abandon Frye and embrace
Daubert for all expert evidence. In 1994, the year after Daubert, the
28
California Supreme Court decided People v. Leahy, in which the
prosecution invited the court to jettison the California approach and adopt
29
a Daubert-style validity inquiry. The court declined the invitation. In late
2012, the court faced this issue once again, in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v.
30
University of Southern California. The Sargon court, however, vacillated.
It paid obeisance to Frye but framed its opinion around Daubert.

21. Id. at 146.
22. Id. at 146.
23. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
24. Id. at 141.
25. Id. at 147 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993)).
26. Id. at 152.
27. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). See David L. Faigman, The Daubert
Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 893, 919 (2013) (describing Weisgram as the fourth case in the Daubert trilogy).
28. 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
29. Id. at 331.
30. 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012).
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The Sargon decision formally reiterated California’s commitment to
Frye. As in Leahy, the court announced that in California, the general
acceptance test still controls the admissibility of testimony “regarding
31
new scientific techniques.” Yet, many passages in Sargon seem to
undermine the assumption that the Frye test, rather than Daubert,
governs in California. As discussed in Part I of this Article, the Sargon
court approvingly cited the three cases in the Daubert line of precedent:
32
Daubert itself, as well as both Joiner and Kumho Tire. Further, the
court did not discuss the core cases of Kelly and Leahy beyond a
33
perfunctory footnote. Even more significantly, Sargon echoed key
passages in the federal decisions. The parallels between Sargon and the
Daubert trilogy are so strong that one commentator has declared that
Sargon aligns “California’s law of expert opinion admissibility with post34
Daubert federal law.” In the words of that commentator, Sargon effects
“a sea-change,” casting the California trial judge in “the same stringent
35
gatekeeper role” as a federal district court applying Daubert.
The purpose of this Article is not to debate the policy merits of the
competing Frye and Daubert approaches. Rather, the more limited
objective of this Article is to assess the extent to which Sargon has
moved California law toward a Daubert-style reliability inquiry. Has a
“sea-change” occurred? Is it accurate to categorize California as the
latest addition to the ranks of Daubert jurisdictions?
Part I describes the three cases that comprise the Daubert trilogy
and attempts to identify their essential teachings. Part II shifts to
discussing California law and Sargon, tracing the history of the Sargon
litigation and explains the California Supreme Court’s treatment of the
Daubert trilogy in Sargon. Finally, Part III compares and contrasts
Sargon and the federal trilogy cases. It demonstrates that although
Sargon represents a major stride toward Daubert’s validity test, it is yet
incorrect to characterize California as a Daubert jurisdiction. Careful
scrutiny of Sargon reveals that though there is much of Daubert in
Sargon, there remain significant differences between Daubert and the
analytic framework outlined in Sargon. California courts may one day
fully embrace Daubert, but it is premature to declare that the day has
already arrived. Instead, in Sargon the California Supreme Court merely
stuck its toes into the rising Daubert tide. Only time will tell whether
California will decide to fully take the plunge.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1252 n.6.
See infra notes 147–157 and accompanying text.
Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252 n.6.
Barnes, supra note 7, at 2.
Id. at 1.
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I. The DAUBERT Trilogy
In order to determine whether Sargon embraces the federal
approach to evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony, it is
necessary to review the leading United States Supreme Court decisions
in the trilogy.
A. DAUBERT
Justice Blackmun concludes part II.A of his majority opinion in
Daubert by stating that the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
36
superseded Frye. In part II.B, he derived the new validation test from the
37
text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The statute refers to “scientific,
38
technical, or other specialized knowledge.” As the Introduction noted,
Justice Blackmun began parsing the language by focusing on the word,
39
“knowledge.” He asserted that Congress’ choice of that term signified
that the expert’s theory or technique must rest on “more than subjective
40
belief or unsupported speculation.” Next, Justice Blackmun endeavored
to interpret the word “scientific.” At this point in his opinion, Justice
Blackmun drew heavily on the amicus briefs submitted by scientists and
41
scientific organizations. In large part, those briefs described the modern
understanding of the scientific process or method. Citing two amicus
briefs, Justice Blackmun wrote:
“Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the
universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing and
refining theoretical explanations about the world that are
subject to further testing and refinement.” But, in order to
qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must
be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must
be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., “good grounds,”
based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an
expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific
knowledge” establishes
42
a standard of evidentiary reliability.
Justice Blackmun listed several factors—such as error rates and peer
review—that the trial judge may consider in evaluating the methodological
soundness of the research that supposedly validates the technique or
theory, but underscored that the “inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a

36. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585–89 (1993).
37. Id. at 589–592.
38. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1975). The same phrase occurs in the 2011 restyled version of Rule 702.
39. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (internal citations omitted).
40. Id.
41. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching Implication of the
Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 55, 60–64 (1995).
42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (quoting Brief for Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Science et al.,
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102)).
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43

flexible one.” Justice Blackmun stated that in conducting the inquiry, the
44
trial judge plays “a gatekeeping role” to “screen” out unreliable
45
testimony.
In part II.B of his opinion, Justice Blackmun stated that the expert’s
46
scientific knowledge must “fit” the case. He elaborated: “‘Fit’ is not
always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily
47
scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.” Justice Blackmun
added that “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry [is] a
48
precondition to admissibility.”
After sketching the substance of the new validation/reliability
standard, Justice Blackmun discussed the procedures that federal trial
judges should follow to apply the standard. He wrote that in order to
decide the admissibility of proffered scientific testimony, the judge must
address the foundational question of whether the proponent has
established that the expert’s underlying technique or theory amounts to
49
reliable “scientific knowledge.” The Justice specifically stated that the
preliminary fact-finding procedures codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
50
104(a) govern the trial judge’s determination. That statement is
significant: When Rule 104(a) applies to a judge’s determination, the
51
judge listens to the foundational testimony proffered by both sides. As
the advisory committee note accompanying Rule 104(a) explains, when
the judge rules under 104(a), she serves as a true “trier of fact.” The
judge weighs the evidence pro and con, considers the credibility of the
52
testimony, and makes a factual determination as to whether the
53
foundational fact exists. In a footnote, Justice Blackmun indicated that
the traditional civil standard of “a preponderance of the proof” governs
54
the judge’s determination. Thus, if the two sides presented conflicting
testimony about the methodology of a critical experimental test of the

43. Id. at 594.
44. Id. at 597.
45. Id. at 589.
46. Id. at 591.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 592.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Determining Preliminary Facts Under Federal Rule 104, in 45 Am.
Jur. Trials §§ 60–62, 64 (Charles S. Parnell ed. 1992) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Preliminary Facts].
Under Rule 104(a), the opponent objecting to the admission of evidence has a right to conduct voir
dire in support of his or her objection. Id. Thus, the opponent has a right to conduct a limited crossexamination during the direct examination before the judge’s ruling on the objection. Id.
52. In Huddleston v. United States, the Court construed Rule 104 and indicated that unlike Rule
104(a), Rule 104(b) may not “weigh[] credibility.” 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
53. See generally Imwinkelried, Preliminary Facts, supra note 51.
54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10.
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validity of the expert’s theory, the judge would not be obliged to accept
55
the proponent’s testimony.
B. JOINER
Like Daubert, Joiner contains important substantive and procedural
precedent. Substantively, Joiner refines the meaning of the concept of “fit”
mentioned in Daubert. In Joiner, the plaintiff claimed that his workplace
exposure to chemical PCB’s had enhanced the onset of his small-cell lung
56
cancer. In part, the plaintiff’s expert based his causation opinion on
several animal studies. In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist detailed
some of the studies:
The studies involved infant mice that had developed cancer after
being exposed to PCB’s. The infant mice in the studies had had
massive doses of PCB’s injected directly into their peritoneums or
stomachs. Joiner was an adult human being whose alleged
exposure to PCB’s was far less than the exposure in the animal
studies. The PCB’s were injected into the mice in a highly
concentrated form. The fluid with which Joiner had come into
contact generally had a much smaller PCB concentration . . . . The
cancer that these mice developed was alveologenic adenomas;
Joiner had developed small-cell carcinomas. No study
demonstrated that
adult mice developed cancer after being
57
exposed to PCB’s.
In effect, the trial judge ruled that the empirical studies cited by the
plaintiff did not “fit” the opinion proffered by the plaintiff’s expert.
There were so many dissimilarities—human being versus mouse, adult
versus infant, dermal exposure versus injection, modest exposure versus
massive doses, and different cancers—that the studies did not adequately
support the expert’s opinion that the PCB exposure had caused the
58
plaintiff’s cancer.
In affirming the trial judge’s decision, the Supreme Court held that
under Daubert the trial judge had the right to inquire whether the
conditions obtained in the studies were sufficiently analogous to the
59
conditions in Joiner’s case. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the judge
had the power to inquire whether the expert had engaged in
60
unwarranted extrapolation. Chief Justice Rehnquist also stated that the
judge may test the connection between “the data” cited by the expert

55. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Litigating Credibility: Expert Witness, Nat’l L.J., July 2, 2001, at
A12. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial
Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury’s Province to
Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
56. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
57. Id. at 144.
58. Id. at 144–45.
59. Id. at 146.
60. Id.
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61

and the opinion proffered by the expert. If the judge concludes that
“there is simply too great an analytical gap,” the judge should exclude
62
the opinion.
Procedurally, Chief Justice Rehnquist expanded on what was meant
by the “flexible” inquiry mentioned in Daubert. The Chief Justice
emphasized that the trial judge enjoys discretion in evaluating the
reliability of the proffered evidence and in weighing the factors like error
63
rate that were mentioned in Daubert. The Supreme Court did not affirm
the trial judge’s ruling on the ground that the evidence proffered by the
plaintiff was inadmissible as a matter of law. Rather, the Court held only
that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in concluding that the
empirical studies cited by the plaintiff lent inadequate support to the
64
expert’s opinion. The Court held that on the facts, notably the
numerous dissimilarities, it was “within the District Court’s discretion to
conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied were not
sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to support their
65
conclusions that Joiner’s exposure to PCB’s contributed to his cancer.”
The Court stated clearly both that the trial judge’s determination was
discretionary in character and that the appropriate scope of appellate
66
review was abuse of discretion.
C. KUMHO TIRE
As it became increasingly clear that the federal courts were applying
67
“exacting standards of reliability” to determine the admissibility of
purportedly scientific testimony under Daubert, the proponents of
admissibility attempted to circumvent Daubert. As previously stated, the
Daubert Court derived the validation/reliability standard from the
wording of Rule 702. While 702 mentions “scientific . . . knowledge,” it
68
also refers to “technical, or other specialized knowledge.” The
proponents of admissible expert testimony argued that the standards
enunciated in Daubert and Joiner applied only to scientific expertise and
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 141–43.
64. Id. at 141–43, 146–47.
65. Id. at 146–47.
66. Id. at 141–43, 146–47. But see David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence
Under Daubert and Joiner, 48 Hastings L.J. 969, 979 (1997) (arguing that the appellate courts are
uniquely situated to determine and balance the policy implications raised by the science, to ensure
consistency across jurisdictions, and to evaluate the methods, principles and reasoning of multiple
research studies); Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts
Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 987, 1023 (2003) (arguing that appellate
courts should apply a de novo standard when reviewing rulings admitting or excluding evidence
presented as science).
67. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
68. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1975).
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that non-scientific technical or specialized expertise was exempt from the
Daubert test. After all, in footnote 8 of the Daubert opinion, Justice
Blackmun had remarked: “Rule 702 also applies to ‘technical, or other
specialized knowledge.’ Our discussion is limited to the scientific context
69
because that is the nature of the expertise offered here.” The footnote
made it more credible to argue that a proponent could escape the rigors
of Daubert by the simple expedient of labeling the proffered expert
testimony “technical” or “specialized.”
The Court grappled with this argument in 1999 in Kumho Tire Co.
70
v. Carmichael. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer rejected any
proposed distinction between scientific and non-scientific expertise. First,
Justice Breyer rejected the distinction as a matter of statutory
construction. He pointed out that although Rule 702 used three distinct
terms, “scientific, technical, or . . . specialized,” all three adjectives
71
modified the same noun, “knowledge.” Reprising Daubert, he stated
that the term “knowledge” is the source of the “standard of evidentiary
72
reliability.” Secondly, he questioned the logical validity of the proposed
distinction:
[I]t would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to
administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping
obligation depended upon a distinction between “scientific”
knowledge and “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge.
There is no clear line that divides the one from the others.
Disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge.
Pure scientific theory itself may depend for its development
upon observation and properly engineered machinery. And
conceptual efforts to distinguish the two are unlikely to produce
73
clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases.
However, Justice Breyer then bowed to common sense. It was
evident that many of the factors listed in Daubert, such as peer review
and publication, were derived from a classical scientific model. Although
the majority agreed that Rule 702 mandates a showing of reliability
across the board for any type of claimed expertise, Justice Breyer
74
realized that it can be difficult to fit a square peg in a round hole. Justice
Breyer therefore emphasized the language of Daubert to state that the
75
reliability inquiry is “a flexible one.” Justice Breyer acknowledged that
some of the factors listed in Daubert may not apply when the witness’

69. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.8 (1993) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
70. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
71. Id. at 147.
72. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
73. Id. at 148.
74. It is often asserted that it is impossible to do so. Of course, that assertion is an overstatement.
A very small square peg can easily fit into a very large round hole.
75. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,150 (1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).
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expertise is non-scientific in character. For instance, a witness will be
hard pressed to determine the error rate for expert theories about
77
“criminal modus operandi . . . [or] agricultural practices.” As a result,
Justice Breyer explained that “the trial judge must have considerable
leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining
78
whether particular expert testimony is reliable.”
While Joiner grants the trial judge discretion in applying the factors
listed in Daubert, Kumho Tire confers on judges evaluating non-scientific
expertise a different, deeper type of discretion to select factors that can
79
serve as “reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.”
This discretion, however, is not without limits. As Justice Scalia wrote in
his concurring opinion in Kumho Tire, although “the Daubert factors are
not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of
80
them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.”

II. The SARGON Opinion
In light of Part I, we can now consider Sargon. This Part highlights
both the similarities to and the differences from the analytical framework
developed in the Daubert line of authority.
A. The Prior History of the SARGON Litigation
The plaintiff, Sargon Enterprises, Inc., is a dental implant
81
manufacturer. Most implants on the market must be made in several
stages. For example, the implant offered by the largest manufacturer
82
requires three steps, spanning weeks. However, Sargon patented a
dental implant procedure that allowed the implant to be completed in a
83
single day. To prepare for a publicity campaign for its new procedure,
Sargon entered into a contract with the University of Southern California
84
(“USC”) School of Dentistry in 1996. USC agreed to conduct a clinical
study of Sargon’s implant procedure. If the results of the study were
positive, then Sargon could use the study in its publicity campaign; in
addition, all the USC dental graduates from this time period would be
85
familiar with the procedure and more likely to use it in practice.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 159 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1240 (Cal. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1243.
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Unfortunately, Sargon’s hopes were not realized. Sargon claimed that
86
USC “sabotaged” the study by, inter alia, failing to produce the periodic
reports of the study’s progress as USC had promised. Sargon sued USC for
87
breach of contract in 1999. The litigation then became a tale of two
hearings and two appeals.
1. The First Hearing and Appeal
Before the first hearing in the case, USC filed motion in limine to
exclude Sargon’s expert testimony about lost profits on the ground that
88
USC could not have foreseen them. As the basis for its motion, USC
invoked the well-settled principle of contract law that an innocent plaintiff
may recover only types of damages that the defendant should have
89
foreseen at time of contract formation. Relying on that principle, the
90
trial judge granted the motion. The case then proceeded to trial. At the
2003 trial, the jury found that USC had breached its contract with Sargon
91
and awarded Sargon over $400,000 in compensatory damages. However,
the award did not include any recovery for lost profits; pursuant to the in
limine ruling, the trial judge forbade Sargon from submitting any
testimony about such profits.
Sargon appealed from the judgment on the ground that the trial
judge had misapplied the foreseeability principle; Sargon contended that
although there may have been some uncertainty about the amount of lost
profits, it was foreseeable that Sargon would lose profits if USC breached
92
93
the contract. The Court of Appeal agreed with Sargon and reversed.
However, the court stated that given that “the in limine hearings focused
on foreseeability and not the amount of lost profit damages, it is
premature to determine whether such damages can be calculated with
94
reasonable certainty.” That statement shifted the battleground from the
foreseeability principle to another contract principle—namely, the rule
95
that to be recoverable, damages must be reasonably certain. Although
some jurisdictions now restrict the certainty requirement to the fact of
damage, California still applies the requirement to both the fact and the
96
amount of damage.

86. Id. at 1249.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.14 (3d ed. 1999) (citing Hadley v. Baxendale,
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854)).
90. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1249.
91. Id. at 1240.
92. Id. at 1240.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Farnsworth, supra note 89, § 12.15.
96. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1253–54.
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2. The Second Hearing and Appeal
On remand after the initial appeal, the trial judge conducted an
eight-day evidentiary hearing on the question of whether the plaintiff’s
97
lost profits damages were sufficiently certain to be recoverable. The
98
primary witness at the hearing was the plaintiff’s expert James Skorheim.
Skorheim testified that he was a certified public accountant as well as an
attorney; he had served as a business consultant and forensic accountant
99
for twenty-five years.
Skorheim testified that he had intensively researched the dental
100
implant industry. His research indicated that although worldwide there
were ninety-six companies marketing dental implants, “the Big Six”
101
controlled over eighty percent of global sales. Sargon was part of the
industry, but its sales accounted for only one half of one percent of the
102
world market. In 1998, the year before filing suit, Sargon’s net profits
103
had been $101,000.
After surveying the industry, Skorheim developed his “market
104
drivers” hypothesis. According to his theory, three factors largely
determine a company’s share of the dental implant market: (1) the
innovativeness of its products; (2) clinical studies validating the
105
effectiveness of its products; and (3) outreach to general practitioners.
However, he acknowledged that almost all the dental implant companies
both sponsor clinical studies and engage in outreach to general practitioner
106
dentists. Thus, by process of elimination, the innovativeness of a
107
company’s products emerged as the key determinant of its market share.
Skorheim conceded that he was not a dentist and, for that matter,
could not specify criteria that a jury could use to determine the degree of
108
innovativeness of a company’s products. He admitted that “the jury
109
would have to ‘wrestle’ with” that question. However, he believed that
the jury could resolve the issue because during his research he had heard
people state that an immediate load implant like the procedure Sargon
110
had patented was “the holy grail of dental implantology.”
97. Id. at 1241.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1242. “The Big Six” were Nobel Biocare, Straumann, Biomet 3i, Zimmer, Dentsply, and
Astra Tech. Id.
102. Id. at 1243.
103. Id. at 1242.
104. Id. at 1241.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1242, 1246.
108. Id. at 1244.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1241.
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Based on a comparison between Sargon and the Big Six, Skorheim
opined that between 1998 and 2009, with the benefit of a timely,
favorable clinical study, the innovative dental implant procedure would
have enabled Sargon to become one of the world leaders in the
111
industry. Because he admittedly lacked the expertise to determine how
innovative Sargon’s procedure was, he proposed submitting four
112
different scenarios to the jury. If the jury found that Sargon’s
innovation was “meaningful,” during that period Sargon would have
gained a 3.75% market share and realized approximately a quarter of a
billion dollars in profits; if the jury decided that the innovation was
“somewhat greater,” the market share would rise to 5% and the profits
to a third of a billion dollars; if it was “somewhat greater yet,” the market
share would be 10% and the profits would be in excess of $600,000,000;
and if the innovation was “revolutionary,” the market share would
increase to 20% and the profits would grow to approximately $1.2 billion
113
dollars.
Skorheim acknowledged that his estimates posited a number of
assumptions. For instance, he assumed that during the 1998–2009 period,
114
one of the Big Six would fall out of that group. Further, he did not
account for the possibility that Sargon’s competitors would respond by
115
developing even more innovative products. He appeared to assume that
“the Big Six would have taken no steps to contend with their new
116
competitor, Sargon.” Moreover, although in 2007 Sargon was only “a
117
without a marketing or research and
three-person operation”
118
development department, he assumed that Sargon would marshal the
financial resources and managerial skill to overcome those handicaps and
rival the Big Six.
119
Based on this record, the trial judge excluded Skorheim’s testimony.
The judge found several flaws in the foundation for Skorheim’s opinions.
To begin with, the judge concluded that Skorheim’s lost profit estimates
were based on an invalid comparison between Sargon and the Big Six
120
market leaders; Sargon was too dissimilar. By “objective business
measure[s]” such as the number of employees, Sargon and the Big Six
121
were “worlds apart.” By way of example, in the 2001–2003 period

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1244.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1242, 1257.
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id. at 1245–46.
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Nobel Biocare had eighty field representatives in the United States
122
alone. Further, the submission of Skorheim’s opinions to the jury
would require the jury to determine the degree of innovativeness of
Sargon’s products; because Skorheim admitted that he could not
articulate any criteria of innovativeness, the jury would have no
123
“standards from which it [could] make a rational decision.” In addition,
the judge faulted Skorheim’s reliance on speculative assumptions such as
the failure of the Big Six to retain their market shares by aggressively
124
responding to Sargon’s competition.
Just as Sargon had appealed the trial judge’s initial ruling on the
contract issue, Sargon appealed the judge’s order excluding Skorheim’s
125
testimony on evidentiary grounds. Once again, Sargon prevailed. Just
as the Court of Appeal had rebuffed the trial judge’s analysis of the
foreseeability issue, in the second appeal the court rejected the judge’s
imposition of the limitations on Skorheim’s expert testimony by a two-to126
one vote. Although the court noted that there was merit in many of the
judge’s criticisms of Skorheim’s testimony, the court held that under
California evidence law those issues “were better left for the jury’s
127
assessment.” Under the court’s construction of California evidence law,
the weaknesses in Skorheim’s testimony cut to its weight, not its
admissibility.
B. The California Supreme Court’s Opinion in SARGON
While Sargon appealed the trial judge’s evidentiary ruling to the
Court of Appeal, USC prosecuted an appeal of the Court of Appeal’s
decision to the California Supreme Court. On November 26, 2012, the
California Supreme Court rendered a unanimous opinion, with Justice
Chin writing for the court.
On appeal, Sargon challenged USC to identify any statutory basis for
excluding Skorheim’s testimony. At the outset of his analysis, Justice Chin
addressed that challenge. Sargon argued that Skorheim’s testimony
satisfied California Evidence Code section 801. In pertinent part, section
801(b) allows an expert to base an opinion on matter “that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon
128
the subject.” Sargon contended that Skorheim had established that
forensic valuation experts such as himself routinely rely on the sort of
market studies that he had conducted in the instant case.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1248 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id.
Cal. Evid. Code § 80i (2012).
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While acknowledging Sargon’s argument, Justice Chin responded
that “Evidence Code section 801 is not the only statute that governs the
129
trial court’s gatekeeping role.” Citing a recent Loyola Law Review
130
article on point (the “Loyola article”), written by the present Authors,
the Justice stated that Evidence Code section 802 applies. In pertinent
part, section 802 provides: “A witness testifying in the form of an opinion
may state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the
matter . . . upon which it is based, unless he is precluded by law from
131
using such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion.”
Justice Chin immediately pointed out that section 160 of the Evidence
132
Code contains a definition of “law.” According to that section, the term
133
“law” in the California Evidence Code includes “decisional law.” Hence,
construed in light of section 160, section 802 authorizes the California
judiciary to enforce uncodified limitations on the “reasons” underlying a
134
proffered expert opinion.
The question then became whether the trial judge had properly
exercised that authority in excluding Skorheim’s testimony. Justice Chin
stated that in California, the normal scope of appellate review of trial
135
court evidentiary decisions is an abuse of discretion. Writing for the
court, Justice Chin held that the trial judge’s ruling was not an abuse of
136
discretion. He agreed with each of the trial judge’s fundamental
criticisms of the foundation for Skorheim’s opinions.
Quoting the Loyola article, the court ruled that under section 802,
the judge may at the very least conduct “a ‘circumscribed inquiry’ to
‘determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and other
information cited by experts adequately support the conclusion that the
137
expert’s general theory or technique is valid.’” In the court’s view,
Skorheim’s testimony did not adequately support his proffered opinions
because, as the trial judge had found, Sargon was not substantially
similar to the Big Six that Skorheim had used for purposes of
138
comparison. The court approvingly quoted the trial judge’s finding that
Sargon was not similar to the industry leaders by “any relevant, objective
139
business measure.” The court underscored Skorheim’s admission that

129. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1251.
130. Id. at 1251–52.
131. Cal. Evid. Code § 802.
132. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252.
133. Cal. Evid. Code § 160.
134. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1256.
137. Id. at 1252 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried & David L. Faigman, Evidence Code Section 802: The
Neglected Key to Rationalizing the Law of Expert Testimony, 42 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 427, 449 (2009)).
138. Id. at 1256.
139. Id.
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Sargon was distinguishable from the Big Six by “objective business
140
metric[s], such as sales or number of employees.”
Likewise, the court concurred with the trial judge’s conclusion that
Skorheim’s inability to articulate guidelines for a jury determination of a
degree of innovativeness was fatal to the admissibility of Skorheim’s
141
opinions. Without the benefit of any criteria or guidelines, the jury’s
determination of “the degree of innovativeness” would lack a “rational
142
basis.”
Finally, the court agreed with the trial judge that Skorheim’s
opinions rested on several critical, conjectural assumptions. The court
observed:
An accountant might be able to determine with reasonable
precision what Sargon’s profits would have been if it had
achieved a market share comparable to one of the Big Six. The
problem here, however, is that the expert’s testimony provided
no logical basis
to infer that Sargon would have achieved that
143
market share.
In particular, the court pointed to Skorheim’s highly debatable
assumptions that one of the Big Six companies would drop out of the
market and that the members of the Big Six would not take effective
144
measures to counter Sargon’s competition. Given the questionable
nature of these assumptions, Justice Chin held that the trial judge had not
145
erred in barring Skorheim’s opinions because they were “speculative.”

III. Expert Evidence in California After SARGON
This Article’s Introduction noted that following Daubert, states
must consider whether they should follow the federal regime. Most states
have adopted Daubert to one extent or another. Sargon reinvigorates the
issue in California and places the question front and center: Is California
now a Daubert state?
This Part shows that the answer is not a simple yes or no. Sargon is
highly significant for California’s expert evidence law in ways that reach
beyond whether California can now be categorically declared a Daubert
state. There are three separate but related ways that Sargon must be
understood vis-a-vis Daubert. The first is that unlike previous California
case law, Sargon alters the fundamental focus of a trial court’s
admissibility decision. Before Sargon, California courts either deferred to
what was generally accepted in a particular field or accepted the

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1255–56.
Id. at 1247.
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1258.
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professional practice of the testifying witness. After Sargon, trial judges
have been appointed gatekeepers charged with scrutinizing the reliability
of all expert evidence.
Subpart A explains that on this issue Sargon generally aligns with
Daubert. Subpart B explores an issue left ambiguous in Sargon: How the
decision will impact the California courts’ longstanding differential
treatment of technologically-based scientific evidence and non-technical
or experience-based expert evidence. Although Sargon seems to apply to
all expert testimony, the court did not explicitly abandon the old KellyFrye approach as applied to scientific evidence. Quite to the contrary,
Sargon indicates that the Kelly-Frye test survives. The question,
discussed in Subpart B, is how the courts should apply Sargon in
conjunction with California’s Kelly-Frye standard. While Subparts A and
B deal with the substantive scope and operation of Sargon, Subpart C
turns to the question of whether Sargon mandates the same procedural
regime prescribed by Daubert. Subpart C answers that question in the
negative. Thus, on this issue Sargon generally does not align with
Daubert. The upshot of the analysis in Subparts A through C is that while
there is much of Daubert in Sargon, and Sargon is likely to transform
California practice, it is an oversimplification to say that California is
now a Daubert state.
A. SARGON’s DAUBERT Perspective
To the extent that Daubert was revolutionary, it was so because the
decision fundamentally altered the way that trial courts perceived and
146
evaluated expert evidence. Daubert focused courts on the methods and
principles that underlie expert testimony and thus required judges and
lawyers to understand the basis for the knowledge being claimed in
court. In comparison, under the Frye test courts merely ask whether the
basis for the expert opinion was generally accepted among those most
likely to know. Daubert refocused courts’ attention on the bases
themselves. Sargon no longer permits trial judges to defer to some proxy
professional group, but rather assigns them the weighty responsibility of
inquiring how the knowledge was derived. In epistemological terms, what
is the group’s knowledge claim, and is there an adequate warrant for the
claim?
Although this question of analytical perspective may appear
theoretical, it has myriad practical implications. Before Daubert, many
experts testified on the basis of little more than conjecture and
supposition. Many of the forensic identification sciences—including fields
such as bitemarks, arson, and handwriting—are based principally on
consensus in the field rather than empirical data validating their expert
146. See generally Faigman, supra note 27.
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methodologies. This difference is even more dramatic in the areas of
medicine, psychology, and psychiatry. In these areas, California has
traditionally applied the “opinion rule” to admit expert opinion with
virtually no scrutiny if the opinion was based on the experience of an
147
otherwise qualified expert. Daubert calls on courts not to defer to
guild-like consensus, but instead to independently inquire into the
soundness and adequacy of the bases of claimed expert knowledge.
While California courts previously employed standards of deference to
professional fields—under either Frye’s general acceptance precept or
the opinion rule—Sargon endorses the independent perspective
embraced by the Daubert trilogy.
Daubert assigns federal trial judges a gatekeeping responsibility to
screen out unreliable testimony. In short, the California Supreme Court
borrowed key terminology from the Daubert lexicon in Sargon. At several
points in his opinion, for example, Justice Chin uses the expression
“gatekeeping” to describe the role of a California judge passing on the
148
admissibility of expert testimony. Further, Justice Chin repeatedly
makes it clear that the purpose of that assignment is to task the trial judge
149
to exclude “unreliable” expert testimony.
Significantly, when the Sargon court defined the determination that
the California judge must make as a gatekeeper, the court used language
strikingly similar to the corresponding passage in Daubert. In his opinion,
Justice Blackmun wrote that the federal trial judge must decide whether
150
the expert’s opinion is “supported by appropriate validation.” In the
equivalent portion of his opinion, Justice Chin stated that the California
trial judge must “determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and
other information cited by experts adequately support the” expert’s
151
conclusion.
The Sargon court borrowed insights from Kumho Tire as well.
Part I.C explains that the most important teaching of Kumho Tire is that
the reliability requirement arising from Rule 702’s reference to
“knowledge” applies to every type of claimed expertise, whether it is
scientific, technical, or specialized. It is true that in footnote six of his
opinion Justice Chin mentions the general acceptance test and seems to
152
reserve it for gauging the admissibility of “new scientific techniques.”
However, throughout his opinion, Justice Chin makes no distinction

147. David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes: The “Opinion Rule” and Other Oddities and
Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, The Scientific Revolution, and Common Sense, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev.
699, 706–07 (2008).
148. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1249–52, 1258.
149. Id. at 1250, 1252.
150. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
151. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252.
152. Id. at 1252 n.6.
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between the various types of expertise. Rather, the analysis outlined in
the opinion appears to apply to any offer of expert testimony in a
California court. In this respect, Sargon reaches the same result as the
outcome in Kumho Tire.
While Sargon contains passages duplicating the analytics of Daubert
and Kumho Tire, probably the most striking parallel is between Sargon
and Joiner. Part I.B of the opinion noted that the essence of the Joiner
Court’s teaching was that the trial judge had discretion to evaluate the
aptness of the analogy between the conditions in the studies cited by
plaintiff’s experts and the facts in Joiner’s case history. Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the trial judge justifiably found that the
conditions in the “studies were so dissimilar to the facts presented in [the
Joiner] litigation that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District
153
Court to have rejected the experts’ reliance on them.” The Sargon trial
judge relied on an identical mode of reasoning, and like the United
States Supreme Court in Joiner, the California Supreme Court sustained
the trial judge’s reasoning. Just as the Joiner Court listed the differences
between adult humans and infant mice, injection and dermal exposure,
and adenoma and small-cell carcinoma, Justice Chin enumerated several
154
155
“objective business measures,” such as the number of employees and
156
that the trial judge had identified as
sales representatives,
distinguishing Sargon from the Big Six. Echoing Joiner, Justice Chin
found that the trial judge had not abused discretion in concluding that
157
“Sargon was dissimilar to all of the Big Six.” In both cases, the trial
judges second-guessed an analogy underlying the expert’s opinion. And
in both instances, the court of last resort found that the trial judge had
exercised permissible, sensible discretion in rejecting the analogy urged
by the expert.
Notwithstanding the clear parallels between Sargon and the Daubert
trilogy, it may prove to be a mistake to predict that the California courts
will wholeheartedly embrace the rigorous federal approach to assessing
the admissibility of expert testimony. To begin, Justice Chin’s opinion is
measured, containing abundant language that is consistent with the
California courts’ previously liberal approach to the admissibility of
opinion testimony that is based on non-instrumental expert theories and
158
techniques. Sargon evinces sympathy with the policy considerations
that inspired that liberality. At the beginning of part II.A (devoted to the
evidentiary analysis), Justice Chin quoted Judge Friendly to the effect

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1256.
Id. at 1243, 1246.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1256.
Barnes, supra note 7, at 11.
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that in light of “the guaranty of the Seventh Amendment,” a trial judge
“must be exceedingly careful not to set the threshold to the jury room
159
too high.” Paraphrasing Judge Friendly, Justice Chin stated that “due
160
to the jury trial right, courts should not set the admission bar too high.”
Later in the same part, Justice Chin asserts that trial judges “must . . . be
cautious in excluding expert testimony. . . . [T]he trial court’s task is not
to choose the most reliable of the offered opinions and exclude the
161
others.” Part II.B of his opinion analyzed the interplay between the
contract principle of certainty and the expert opinion rules. Justice Chin
wrote:
Once again, we add a cautionary note. The lost profit inquiry is always
speculative to some degree. Inevitably, there will be an element of
uncertainty. Courts must not be too quick to exclude expert evidence
as speculative merely because the expert cannot say with absolute
certainty what the profits would have been. Courts must not eviscerate
the possibility of recovering lost profits by too broadly defining what is
162
too speculative.

Furthermore, in future cases the proponents of expert testimony will
have a plausible argument for distinguishing Sargon on its facts. In the
court’s perspective, Skorheim’s testimony about lost profits was highly
speculative. The facts in the record below were extraordinary. Although
determining the degree of innovativeness was obviously the key to
choosing among Skorheim’s four scenarios, Skorheim admitted frankly
that he could not provide the jury with any criteria or guidelines for
163
making the choice. He conceded bluntly that the lay jurors “would have
164
to ‘wrestle’” with the choice. In his fourth, revolutionary scenario,
165
Sargon’s profits would have skyrocketed by 157,000% —“wildly
166
beyond . . . anything Sargon had ever experienced in the past.” Skorheim
predicted that Sargon would not have merely modest or substantial but
167
rather “spectacular” future success. The facts and claims in Sargon were
so extreme that in a later, more mundane case, the proponent of an expert
opinion will have a plausible argument for distinguishing Sargon. And, as
we have seen, the proponent can strengthen that argument by citing
Justice Chin’s statements to the effect that the Seventh Amendment jury

159. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1250 (quoting Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297
F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1962)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1252.
162. Id. at 1254.
163. Id. at 1246.
164. Id. at 1244.
165. Id. at 1245.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1255.
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trial guarantee counsels that trial judges should think long and hard
168
before denying a jury relevant expert testimony.
Given Justice Chin’s discussion of the jury trial guarantee and the
extreme facts in Sargon, it is an unjustified leap to conclude that Sargon
requires California trial judges to police the quality of expert testimony
in the same manner and to the same extent as the federal courts currently
do. Despite those caveats, it is clear that there is an important common
denominator between Sargon and Daubert. By announcing the federal
trial judge’s “gatekeeping” role, Daubert fundamentally altered the
perspective from which trial judges evaluate expert evidence. Sargon has
done the same for California by stressing the state trial judge’s
“gatekeeping” responsibility. Whatever other differences may persist
between the federal and California approaches to determining the
admissibility of expert testimony, at the very least trial judges must engage
in a Joiner-style analysis under both approaches and, as gatekeepers,
critically inquire whether the proponent’s foundational testimony has
169
sufficient probative value to support the expert’s knowledge claim.
B. Reconciling SARGON’s DAUBERT Perspective with KELLY-FRYE
Until Sargon, it was fair to say that while the federal courts enforced
Daubert, California remained committed to the Frye general acceptance
standard. Subpart A demonstrated that Sargon moved toward Daubert in
requiring California trial judges to adopt a critical “gatekeeping”
perspective. However, the Sargon court briefly alluded to the Kelly-Frye
general acceptance test in a footnote. Footnote six reads in its entirety:
In People v. Leahy, this court held that the “general acceptance” test
for admissibility of expert testimony based on new scientific techniques
still applies in California courts despite the United States Supreme
Court’s rejection in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. of a
similar test in federal courts. Nothing we say in this case affects our
170
holding in Leahy regarding new scientific techniques.

Thus, it appears that Kelly-Frye is still good law in California. How will
California’s traditional Kelly-Frye test operate in conjunction with
Sargon? There are two thoughts to bear in mind.
First, the differences between the general acceptance and validation
tests should not be overstated. Daubert’s assignment of a gatekeeping
role to trial judges does not make Daubert a more rigorous test than its
predecessor Frye. Daubert has been extolled and excoriated for being

168. It’s worth noting, however, that Justice Blackmun in Daubert similarly stated, as Justice Chin
emphasized, the “liberal thrust” underlying evidentiary rules. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). This issue is discussed further in Part II.B.
169. People v. Dry Canyon Enters., 211 Cal. App. 4th 486, 493 (2012) (citing Sargon, 288 P.3d at
1237)) (“Trial judges have a substantial gatekeeping responsibility when it comes to expert testimony.”).
170. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
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both too rigorous and too permissive toward proffered expert testimony.
But the validation test itself is not inherently more or less demanding
than Frye. The focus of the validation test is simply different, which can
lead to very different results. While Frye defers to a respective field’s
view of the bases for its members’ expertise, Daubert tasks judges to
independently assess the claimed bases for an expert’s ostensible
expertise. Frye, therefore, should be expected to be more liberal than
Daubert when applied to fields with considerable consensus of opinion,
but which lack a robust methodological foundation. Conversely, Daubert
can be expected to be more liberal than Frye when applied to fields that
are highly contentious, but which possess considerable methodological
underpinnings.
Moreover, Daubert contains considerable language extolling the
“liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The opinion begins by
describing the liberality of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the need
171
for fact-finders to hear all relevant evidence, and proceeds to observe
that the “basic standard of relevance” in the Federal Rules “is a liberal
172
one.” The Court also noted the Rules’ “permissive backdrop” and the
173
“austere standard” inherent in the traditional Frye approach.
Significantly, the Court stated that the “rigid ‘general acceptance’
requirement would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal
Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
174
‘opinion’ testimony.’”
When Daubert was decided, the principal issue presented was the
continuing viability of the Frye test under federal law. The Daubert
Court held that the Federal Rules did not incorporate Frye, and the
Court consequently construed Rule 702 as supplanting Frye. However, in
discussing how courts should implement the validity approach mandated
by the Federal Rules, the Daubert Court observed that “‘general
175
acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.” Although general
acceptance was no longer the litmus test, it remained pertinent. To be
specific, general acceptance can furnish relevant circumstantial evidence
of the methodological soundness of the reasoning and data underlying an
expert’s technique; if a technique has been in circulation long enough to
have garnered general acceptance, other experts have presumably had
time to study the technique’s bases and have come away satisfied.
General acceptance, the centerpiece of Frye, became one of the four
factors the Court identified (along with testability, error rate, and peer
review and publication) as useful for determining whether the proffered
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
Id. at 594.
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expert opinion is adequately supported by valid methods and
176
principles. Indeed, many federal trial judges have ascribed considerable
177
weight to this factor in conducting their Daubert calculus. Thus, general
acceptance plays a significant role under both Daubert and Frye.
178
Secondly, Sargon and Kelly-Frye can plausibly coexist in California.
While in Sargon the court offered no clear guidance regarding how the
more Daubert-like perspective it embraced is to be reconciled with past
practice, the key to understanding footnote six may come from the
paragraph it follows, in which the court summarizes its holding. The court
explains that:
[U]nder Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802,
the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion
testimony that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an
expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons
unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3)
speculative. Other provisions of law, including decisional law,
may also 179provide reasons for excluding expert opinion
testimony.
According to the court, Evidence Code sections 801 and 802 mandate a
gatekeeping role for trial courts that applies to all expert testimony.
These code sections require trial judges to enforce a minimum threshold
for expert evidence. The California trial judge must inspect the premises
of any proffered expert opinions to ensure that they fall above the
threshold.
However, the Sargon opinion suggests that in certain cases, the
threshold might be higher. When, as the California Supreme court stated
180
in People v. McDonald, the expert evidence is “produced by a machine,”
the proffered testimony may have to pass muster under Kelly-Frye as well
as section 801. Once the Sargon court construed section 802 as
empowering it to enforce uncodified limitations on expert testimony,
Sargon legitimated continued judicial enforcement of the general
acceptance test. The California courts might still reason that instrumental
scientific evidence presents such a substantial risk of overawing lay jurors
that certain types of expert testimony ought to be singled out and
required to run the gauntlet of both Kelly-Frye and sections 801 and 802.
It remains to be seen whether the California courts will reconcile
Sargon and Kelly-Frye in this fashion. To an extent, this reconciliation
would require California judges to differentiate between truly “scientific”

176. Id. at 593–95.
177. See generally Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert
Evidence in Federal Civil Actions Since the Daubert Decision, 8 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 251 (2002).
178. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Frye’s General Acceptance Test vs.
Daubert’s Validation Standard—“Either . . . Or” or “Both . . . And”?, 33 Crim. L. Bull. 72 (1997).
179. Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1252 (Cal. 2012).
180. 690 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1984).
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testimony and non-scientific expertise—the type of line drawing that the
Kumho Tire Court eschewed. In Kumho Tire, Justice Breyer asserted that
“it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer
evidentiary rules under which . . . [the admissibility standard] depended
upon a distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or
181
‘other specialized’ knowledge.” There is certainly merit in Justice
Breyer’s assertion. However, the California courts could solve that
problem by restricting the more demanding standard to purportedly
scientific testimony involving instrumentation; the incorporation of that
element into the scope limitation might render the scope limitation more
judicially manageable. In effect, this is what courts did prior to Sargon,
and despite Justice Breyer’s epistemological point to the contrary,
California courts might continue to do so after Sargon. Certainly, logic
does not dictate that the general acceptance and validation tests are
182
mutually exclusive. After Sargon, the two tests may exist side by side in
California courts, and the courts may rule that scientific expert testimony
based on instrumental analysis must satisfy both tests.
C. A Comparison of the Procedures for Applying DAUBERT and
SARGON
Under both the Daubert trilogy and Sargon, the trial judge must
employ a critical, “gatekeeping” perspective. The question is whether
Sargon authorizes a California judge to probe as deeply as Daubert
mandates. Subpart A demonstrates that Sargon suggests that the
California Supreme Court sympathizes with the federal approach to expert
opinion testimony. A close reading of the Sargon opinion, however,
indicates that the Sargon court stopped short of fully embracing the
procedural demands set forth in Daubert. As Part I.A emphasizes, in his
opinion Justice Blackmun explicitly stated that the preliminary factfinding approach codified in Federal Rule 104(a) governs the trial judge’s
reliability determination under Daubert. Part I.A explains that when
104(a) governs, the trial judge acts as a trier of fact; the trial judge must
consider the foundational testimony on both sides and can weigh the
183
credibility of the testimony in choosing which testimony to believe. In
federal practice, the trial judge decides by a preponderance of the
evidence, after weighing the foundational testimony on both sides,
whether there is adequate, methodologically sound empirical data and

181. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999).
182. Imwinkelried, supra note 178, at 83.
183. The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule 702
contemplates that the judge will consider the evidence on both sides. For example, it refers to “Claar
v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502–05 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the trial court’s technique of
ordering experts to submit serial affidavits explaining the reasoning and methods underlying their
conclusions).” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note.
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reasoning to support the hypothesis that the expert’s theory or technique
is valid.
In the critical passage in Sargon, Justice Chin stopped short of
assigning or empowering California trial judges the responsibility to make
such a decision. Again, quoting the Loyola article, Justice Chin stated that
a California trial judge must conduct “a circumscribed inquiry’ to
‘determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and other information
cited by experts adequately support the conclusion that the expert’s
184
general theory or technique is valid.” Notice two things about the
wording of that statement. First, rather than mentioning both sides’
foundational testimony, the statement can be interpreted as referring only
to “the studies and other information cited by [the proponent’s]
185
experts.” Second, and more importantly, the statement does not require
the trial judge to make a factual determination by a preponderance of the
evidence. Rather, the statement directs the trial judge to make a
“circumscribed” decision “as a matter of logic.” That language is consistent
with the assumption that the California trial judge is to focus on the
proponent’s foundational testimony and decide whether “as a matter of
logic” that testimony is adequate to support the hypothesis of the validity
of the expert’s underlying theory or technique.
Several aspects of Sargon support this limited reading. The court
describes Skorheim as “the primary witness” at the hearing on USC’s
186
motion in limine. Nowhere in the opinion does the court mention any
defense testimony contradicting Skorheim’s factual testimony about
Sargon, the Big Six, or the global market. For that matter, there is no
passage in the opinion in which the court rejected as incredible any of
Skorheim’s foundational testimony. As far as the opinion indicates, both
the trial court and the California Supreme Court accepted that testimony
at face value and confined their analyses to the question of whether “as a
matter of logic” that testimony provided adequate support for
Skorheim’s ultimate opinions. In large part because of the inaptness of
the analogy between Sargon and the Big Six, the trial judge answered
that question in the negative, and the California Supreme Court found
this that answer did not amount to an abuse of the trial judge’s
discretion.
A limited reading becomes even more plausible when one considers
the Sargon court’s repeated references to the earlier Lockheed Litigation

184. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried & David L. Faigman, Evidence
Code Section 802: The Neglected Key to Rationalizing the Law of Expert Testimony, 42 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 427, 449 (2009)).
185. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & David L. Faigman, Evidence Code Section 802: The Neglected
Key to Rationalizing the Law of Expert Testimony, 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 427, 449 (2009).
186. Sargon, 288 P.3d. at 1241.
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187

Cases. Like Sargon, those consolidated cases asked whether the
California judiciary possesses the authority to impose decisional restrictions
on the admissibility of expert testimony and, if so, how the courts should
188
exercise that authority. The California Supreme Court never reached
the merits of those questions in the Lockheed Litigation Cases:
In a stunning turn of events in 2007, the Court dismissed review after
the case had been pending before the California Supreme Court for
two years. The apparent explanation is that a majority of members of
the court had stock holdings that they believed required them to recuse
themselves from the case. The justices could have designated pro tem
judges to fill out the panel to decide the case, but they chose not to
exercise that option. However, the upshot is that the disposition of the
189
case left this evidentiary issue unresolved.

Although five years passed between the dismissal of the Lockheed
Litigation Cases and Sargon, Justice Chin’s opinion made it clear that the
court had not forgotten either the cases or the questions that they posed.
Indeed, early in part II.A of his opinion, Justice Chin wrote:
In Lockheed Litigation Cases, the plaintiffs argued that under Evidence
Code section 801, subdivision (b), “a court should determine only
whether the type of matter that an expert relies on in forming his or her
opinion is the type of matter that an expert reasonably can rely on in
forming an opinion, without regard to whether the matter relied on
190
reasonably does support the particular opinion offered.”

It was that very plaintiffs’ argument that had prompted the authors of the
Loyola article (quoted by Justice Chin) to submit an amicus brief in the
191
Lockheed Litigation Cases to challenge the plaintiffs’ argument. When
the court dismissed the Lockheed Litigation Cases, the authors converted
their amicus brief into the Loyola article that was eventually cited by the
192
Sargon court.
In the passage from the Loyola article that Sargon approvingly
quoted, the authors urged the California Supreme Court to adopt the view
that under section 802, California trial judges may conduct a
“circumscribed inquiry” to “determine whether, as a matter of logic, the
studies and other information cited by experts adequately support the
193
conclusion that the expert’s general theory or technique is valid.” In
proposing that view, the authors specifically stated:
[I]n conducting the proposed inquiry under the Evidence Code, a
California trial judge would be playing a much narrower role than the
role assigned to federal judges under Daubert. In Daubert, the Court

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 1250–51 (referencing Lockheed Litig. Cases, 115 Cal. App. 4th 558 (2004)).
Imwinkelried & Faigman, supra note 186, at 428–30.
Id. at 430 (internal citations omitted).
Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1250–51 (internal citations omitted).
Imwinkelried & Faigman, supra note 185, at 429–30.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 449.
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expressly stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) governs the
judge’s determination as to whether the proponent has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the expert has validated his or her
theory or technique by sound scientific methodology. When a federal
judge determines the existence of a foundational fact under Rule
104(a), “the judge acts as a trier of fact. . . . If the question is factual in
nature, the judge will of necessity receive evidence pro and con on the
issue.” When the proponent and opponent submit conflicting
testimony about the disputed foundational fact, a federal trial judge
can consider the credibility of the testimony and resolve the dispute on
194
the basis of a credibility determination.

The authors did not specifically argue that California trial judges
195
should be empowered to make such credibility determinations. Instead,
they suggested the more modest proposal that the California Supreme
Court assign trial judges the task of reviewing the proponent’s
foundational testimony to decide whether, as a matter of logic, that
196
testimony furnishes adequate support for the expert’s ultimate opinion.
They provided an example of the minimum inquiry demanded by the
California Evidence Code. Suppose that in a pesticide case, the plaintiff
calls an epidemiologist as an expert:
[T]he expert testifies along the following lines: there are thirty
published studies involving 130,000 patients; every study yielded the
finding that the relative risk was only 1.0; the incidence of cancer in the
exposed group was no higher than the incidence of the disease in the
general population; the expert conducted a metanalysis of the studies;
and that metanalysis also yielded the finding that the relative risk is no
higher. Yet, based solely on the epidemiological [data], the expert is
prepared to testify to the validity of the general theory that exposure to
197
the pesticide causes cancer.

On one hand, this foundational testimony technically satisfies the
letter of Evidence Code section 801 because these are the types of
studies that epidemiologists customarily rely on. On the other hand,
given the studies’ uniform finding that exposure to the pesticide does not
increase the risk of cancer, it is illogical to treat those studies as adequate
support for the expert’s causation opinion. If the judge can enforce only
the letter of section 801, then the judge’s hands are tied—she must admit
the testimony. However, even without a full commitment to Daubert, a
California trial judge could exclude the opinion if she may conduct a
limited inquiry whether “as a matter of logic,” the empirical data cited by
the expert justifies the expert’s opinion.
As in the case of the possible reconciliation of Daubert and KellyFrye, discussed in Subpart B, Sargon does not furnish a clear answer to

194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 446–47 (alterations in original).
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 444.
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the present question. Although the court did not expressly accord
California trial judges the authority to conduct the sort of full-blown
inquiry permissible under Federal Rule 104(a), it did not forbid such an
inquiry. The Sargon court might have contemplated that in the future
California trial judges should be as active as federal judges in conducting
the kind of probing Daubert reliability inquiry permissible under
Rule 104(a). Since 1976, California has employed the Frye general
acceptance test to determine the admissibility of testimony based on novel
198
scientific theories. There is California authority that when the trial judge
rules under Frye, the judge should follow the preliminary fact-finding
procedures set out in California Evidence Code § 405—an analogue to and
199
model for Federal Rule 104(a). Since Frye and Daubert both serve as
admissibility standards for expert testimony, that authority suggests that to
be consistent, California trial judges ought to follow the procedures in
section 405 to determine the reliability of the proffered testimony under
Sargon.

Conclusion
Sargon is arguably the most important California expert testimony
200
decision in nearly two decades. While it is always difficult to forecast
the impact of significant decisions like Sargon, it undeniably moves
California law closer to the federal approach. How much closer remains
to be determined. As we have seen, California courts have traditionally
201
favored the liberal admissibility of expert testimony. Justice Chin’s
decision reminds us that the Seventh Amendment jury trial guarantee
202
shows that, to an extent, that policy has a constitutional dimension.
Part III begins by remarking that there is no simple yes or no answer
to the question of whether Sargon “adopted” Daubert. In one respect, the
two opinions are quite kindred. As we saw in Subpart A, it is undeniable
that to some extent, Sargon requires California trial judges to assume
“gatekeeping” responsibilities and reject any expert’s ipse dixit claim that
his or her knowledge claim is valid. Like the federal trial judge in Joiner, a
California trial judge may now accept arguendo a proponent’s
foundational testimony but still rule that the testimony does not provide
sufficient warrant for the expert’s knowledge claim.
In two other respects, though, it is unclear how closely the new
California approach will track the federal trilogy. First, even after Sargon
the California approach may be more liberal than the federal approach. In
198. See generally In re Robert B., 218 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1985).
199. Fed. R. Evid. 104 advisory committee’s note.
200. Leahy, the case in which the California Supreme Court refused to adopt Daubert, was decided
in 1994. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
201. Barnes, supra note 7, at 2.
202. Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1250 (Cal. 2012).
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Daubert, Justice Blackmun went to some length to explicitly state that
Federal Rule 104(a) governs the federal trial judge’s admissibility
203
analysis. Consequently, the federal judge can probe deeply, even passing
on the credibility of the foundational testimony. The Sargon opinion does
not explicitly empower California trial judges to go that far. Secondly,
however, the California approach may prove to be more demanding—or
at least more complicated—than the federal approach. If Kelly-Frye is
still good law in California, proponents of scientific testimony involving
instrumentation may face the daunting prospect of surmounting both
hurdles to admissibility.
For now, it is uncertain whether California lower courts will give
Sargon a limited reading and conduct only a “circumscribed inquiry” into
whether the proponent’s foundational testimony furnishes adequate
support for the expert’s hypothesis. In the original Daubert decision,
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressly worried about whether it was realistic
204
to expect federal trial judges to act as “amateur scientists.” This worry
might be greater among state court judges. In many jurisdictions, state
trial judges have fewer clerks and more limited access to scientific
205
literature than federal judges. Even if Daubert is the right choice for
the federal judiciary, a state could reasonably conclude that it is not the
206
right path for it to take. Alternatively, the California courts might well
find that a gradual, incremental movement toward the Daubert approach
is preferable. If so, Sargon will certainly mark the beginning of this move.
In Sargon, the California Supreme Court demonstrated its interest in
testing the Daubert waters. Only time will tell whether the court is ready
to take the plunge.

203. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598, 592–95 (1993).
204. Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205. See generally Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges
on Judging Expert in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & Hum. Behav. 433 (2001).
206. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Master Class: Evidence Equilibrium, Nat’l L.J, July 22, 2002, at B9.
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